COVID-19 - Anarchy or Panarchy?

In September 2005, we had reason to worry about the ability of a tightly coupled world to withstand shocks. At that time this included Hurricane Katrina and SARS. More recent crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have arguably outshocked these.

In his analysis of the economic sanctions imposed against Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Simon Jenkins comments that the interdependence of the world’s economies, so long seen as an instrument of peace, has been made a weapon of war.

As the global economy becomes more tightly coupled, the chances of one event having a catastrophic impact on the entire system increase notes an account called @Forrest. Forrest, billed as anti-tech, right-wing dissident thought, uses this statement as part of an argument against geoengineering remedies to climate change, on two grounds. Firstly, because meddling with complex systems is likely to have unforeseen consequences, and secondly because these supposed remedies represent a further power-shift towards global technological elites. (Bill Gates obviously, who else?)

Other thinkers see this as an opportunity to shift from deterministic systems to more adaptive and resilient systems (Wieland) or to shift from technological capitalism to a different sociopolitical system (Zhang).

 

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Tony Dutzik, Defusing a rigged to blow economy: Rebuilding resilience in a suddenly fragile world (Frontier Group, 30 March 2020) reprinted (Strong Towns, 1 April 2020) 

Nick Gall, Panarchitecture: Architecting a Network of Resilient Renewal (Gartner, 24 January 2011)

Tim Harford, Why the crisis is a test of our capacity to adapt (Financial Times, 20 March 2020)

Simon Jenkins, The rouble is soaring and Putin is stronger than ever - our sanctions have backfired (The Guardian, 29 July 2022)

Andreas Wieland, Dancing the Supply Chain: Toward Transformative Supply Chain Management (The Journal of Supply Chain Management. 2021 Jan; 57(1): 58–73.  

Yanzhu Zhang, Is panarchy relevant in the COVID-19 pandemic times? (Blavatnik School of Government, 10 June 2020)

Related blogposts: Efficiency and Robustness - On Tight Coupling (September 2005)

Updated 18 February 2023

Single cause of failure

In May 2010, there was a mysterious plunge in US share prices. At the time an SEC investigation found that no single cause was to blame [BBC News 12 May 2010]. Following further investigation, the SEC now believes that the "flash crash" did indeed have a single cause, which the SEC has traced to an algorithmic trade of around $4 billion, executed by a single trader's computer program [BBC News 1 October 2010]. The authorities have since introduced "circuit breakers", which may help to mitigate the effects of such algorithmic trades in future, and there are hints that further measures could be on the way.

I haven't looked at the detail of these circuit breakers, but my architectural instincts make me uncomfortable with the idea of bolting on an additional mechanism into an already complicated system, in order to mitigate a single point of failure. Surely these circuit breakers will themselves be subject to perverse consequences, as well as being anticipated (and perhaps even deliberately triggered) by ever more sophisticated algorithms.

One of the key principles of distributed systems architecture is the avoidance of a single point of failure. Technical architects tend to focus on technical failure, although security experts often remind them of the equal dangers of socially engineered points of failure in technical systems. Meanwhile, enterprise architects need to pay attention to the possible failure modes of the business and its ecosystem, from a business and sociotechnical perspective.

In the case of the "flash crash", the key question for market regulators and market players is about the resilience and intelligence of the market in the face of certain classes of activity. Although the finger of blame is now pointing to a piece of software, the architectural question here is not software architecture but market architecture - regarding the market as a complex sociotechnical system in which pieces of software interact with other social and economic actors. Architects should beware of thinking that "single point of failure" is merely a technical question.

Efficiency and Robustness - On Tight Coupling

People (including Ian Welsh and Chandler Howell) have been worrying about the ability of a tightly coupled world to withstand shocks - including Hurricane Katrina and SARS. Here are some key quotes from their blogs.

• Our society, as a whole, has no surge protection - no ability to take shocks. We have no excess beds, no excess equipment, no excess ability to produce vaccines or medicines, nothing. Everybody has worshipped at the altar of efficiency for so long that they don't understand that if you don't have extra capacity you have no ability to deal with unexpected events. (IW)
• As we have now seen with Hurricane Katrina, even if the capacity were there, the United States’ ability to manage and allocate that capacity is essentially non-existent. (CH)
  

Welsh quotes some analysis from Sherry Cooper and Donald Coxe, comparing a possible SARS outbreak with the flu pandemic.

• Because our society and economy is so much more integrated and so much more connected (for example the flu had to spread by ship back then), and so much more "just on time" that it isn't really a model you can use. We'll likely get hit harder, faster and because many locations have such limited inventories, relying on getting it as they need it, the supply disruptions are likely to be much worse.

Telecoms analyst Martin Geddes offers a potentially more upbeat perspective, at least in relation to Hurricane Katrina, asking us to distinguish between an emergency and a disaster.

• In an emergency, a distributed piece of information calls for a central response. A disaster, the converse. Those best informed are in the field; those best equipped, in the field. The best disaster response system is the one in your hand when the disaster strikes.

But Geddes's optimism is tempered by his distrust of central committees, and his fear they will abuse their power.

• But the changes needed to make things better are politically painful and resistent by incumbent powers. ... I suspect that central committees will determine we need more central response systems, and weaken the economy by taxing everyone hard to pay for it. The exact opposite of the medicine a “network edge” response would dictate.

There are some interesting (and sometimes shocking) details from the Hurricane Katrina experience, and several different levels of incapacity can be detected. From a systems-of-systems perspective, what I find particularly interesting are the interoperability failures.

• Inability of FEMA to work with medical professionals unless they are part of the National Disaster Medical Team. Inability of FEMA to orchestrate external / autonomous agents. (Overlawyered Blog, via Ernie the Attorney)
• Inability of FEMA to provide appropriate support for people with special needs. Inability of FEMA to collaborate with agencies with specialist knowledge and resources. (Conmergence Blog)

My colleagues and I are currently talking to some large organizations about some of the strategic aspects of interoperability, with particular reference to SOA, and I hope to be permitted to publish some of this material one day. In the meantime, I am keen to collect and analyse more public domain examples of interoperability failures. Please contact me, or link to this blog posting.

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The FEMA response to Hurricane Katrina

Related blogposts:

Efficiency and Robustness - On Central Planning (September 2005)

Efficiency and Robustness - Processing New Orleans mail after Katrina (November 2005)
Technological Progress (October 2005)