Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts

Sunday, January 21, 2018

Another 20 million faces

Just over a year ago, Microsoft launched some software that would guess how old you were. Millions of people were persuaded to donate a selfie to Microsoft in return for playing this game. See my post 85 Million Faces (October 2016).

Google's latest face-collecting gimmick is to find a painting that looks like you. Although the Arts and Culture app was originally launched in 2015, the face-matching feature was only added last month. This weekend the app shot to the number one slot in the downloads chart, and 20 million selfies (and counting) have already been donated to Google.

As @ArwaM comments, facial recognition technology allows Google to find the artwork you most resemble – but it also supports the rise of the surveillance state.


And yet Google cannot (yet) compete with old-fashioned serendipity. Before Museum-Doppelgänger-Hunt was an app, it was a viral meme, featuring (among others) @fleezee.




But there have been other Doppelgänger-Hunts before, using Face Recognition software. For example, the TwinStrangers project. So which is the egg and which the chicken?




Rebecca Fleenor, I'm on the front page of Reddit. This is how it feels (CNET, 13 September 2017)

Christine Hauser, Meet your art twin: a 400-year-old with an oily complexion (New York Times, 17 Jan 2018)

Arwa Mahdawi, Finding your museum doppelganger is fun – but the science behind it is scary (Guardian, 16 January 2018)

Rosie Spinks, Why the Art Museum Doppelgänger meme is to profoundly addictive (Quartzy, 2 January 2018)

Der fremde Zwilling (Spiegel, 15 April 2015) in German

Sunday, January 11, 2015

From Coincidensity to Consilience

In my post From Convenience to Consilience - “Technology Alone Is Not Enough"  (October 2011), I praised Steve Jobs for his role in the design of the Pixar campus, whose physical layout was intended to bring different specialists together in serendipitous interactions.

Thanks to @jhagel and @CoCreatr, I have just read a blogpost by @StoweBoyd commenting on a related project at Google to build a new Googleplex. Because this is Google, this is a bottom-up data-driven project: it is based on a predicted metric of coincidensity, which is sometimes defined as the likelihood of serendipity.

With the right technology (for example, electronic monitoring of the corridors and/or tagging of employees), a corporation like Google can easily monitor and control “casual collisions of the work force”.

But as Ilkka Kakko (@Serendipitor) points out, such measures of coincidensity cannot be equated with true serendipity. I wonder whether Google will be able to correlate casual meetings with enhanced knowledge and understanding, and measure the consequent quantity and quality of innovation? And then reconfigure the campus to improve the results? Hm.


However, the principle of designing physical spaces for human activity rather than for visual elegance is a good one, as is the notion of evidence-based design. Form following function.



Stowe Boyd, Building From The Inside Out (February 2013)

Paul Goldberger, Exclusive Preview: Google’s New Built-from-Scratch Googleplex (Vanity Fair, February 2013)

Ilkka Kakko, Are we reducing the magic of serendipity to the logic of coincidence? (April 2013)

Monday, March 18, 2013

Cloud and Continuity of Supply Risk

@dougnewdick points out the risk of a company becoming over-dependent on Google. His particular example is prompted by Google's announcement that Google Reader will be discontinued.

I have previously commented on the subject of Creeping Business Dependency, the fact that many companies have allowed themselves to become dependent on a particular company, product or technology. Especially Google. If Google decides your website offends against some search engine rules, it is perfectly capable of making your website disappear from searches. (BMW disappeared from Google for three days in 2006 - see my post BMW Search Requests.) A company might well go bust before it could sort the problem out.

Of course, you can't avoid some dependencies, but I think it is important that any significant dependency should be clearly visible in the business architecture. (In general, business architects usually neglect this kind of dependency until I point out specific examples to them.)

When looking at this kind of dependency, it is important to remember the principles of asymmetry - the Product is not the Technology, and the Company is not the Product. There have been a few popular products and platforms whose owners lost interest - these included Bloglines (formerly owned by Ask) and Delicious (formerly owned by Yahoo) - but were revived under new ownership. Users of a popular platform may feel that a large user base provides grounds for optimism that someone will want to keep it going, even if the original owner doesn't wish to. However, there are many products and platforms that have not survived.

More fundamental is the question of the underlying technology. A few years ago, there was considerable confidence and investment in RSS and Atom feeds, and a number of products and platforms were developed to exploit this technology. If there is a healthy ecosystem of different products and platforms, with relatively low switching costs, it doesn't matter much if one product drops out. But if Google and others are losing interest in this technology, that's a much more fundamental problem for anyone who is heavily committed to it.

If Google stops providing a free service, those who really want it may have to pay to get a decent service elsewhere. But this alters the economics of the service ecosystem, with unpredictable consequences. Clearly there is a risk that the service you want (or the service you need your customers to use) is increasingly expensive, inconvenient and ultimately unavailable.


Doug Newdick, Cloud and Continuity of Supply Risk (March 2013)

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Does everyone (except Google) have a platform strategy?

#bizarch The obvious ones - Apple, Amazon, Microsoft

General comments

"The new market disruption is the migration of a large number of demanding customers away from phones-as-voice-products to phones-as-computing-products. The low-end disruption is the migration of a large number of less demanding customers from branded phones to unbranded, commodity phones. ... The new market disruption is evidenced by the shift of fortunes to Apple and Samsung and away from every other device maker." Horace Dediu, The phone market in 2012: a tale of two disruptions (May 2012)
"Apple is the most valuable company in technology (and indeed in the world) because it integrates hardware, software and services. It’s the first, and only, company to do all these three well in service of jobs that the vast majority of consumers want done." Horace Dediu, Which is best: hardware, software or services? (May 2012)


Disney

Back in 2006, people like Hagel thought that Steve Jobs didn't understand platforms. Maybe he didn't then, but he certainly caught up later. 

eBay


Elsevier


Nike


Nokia


Walmart


and finally Google

Steve Yegge compares Google with Amazon: Google has a lot of things in its favour, but its platform strategy is not one of them. See my comment Google as a Platform (NOT) (Oct 2011) 
  • "Page and his management team have mandated that all Googlers focus on seven business areas, and that they don’t look to expand Google’s reach beyond these core initiatives." Farhad Manjoo, Google's Grand Plan (Slate, March 2012)
  • "Page's emphasis on streamlining Google's product line has made the company's thousands of employees focused on how -- and if -- a tool adequately fulfills users' needs." Bianca Bosker, Google's Future (Huffington Post, March 2012)
 That's not a platform strategy, that's a traditional product portfolio strategy!

Thursday, January 05, 2012

Unruly Google and VPEC-T

Google has been hoist by its own petard: it seems obliged to ban its own browser from its own search engine for infringing its strict rules. Apparently the infringement resulted from some misbehaviour somewhere down the subcontract chain, unknown to Google itself or its prime subcontractor (which with fitting irony is called Unruly Media). A number of blogposts were created to promote Google Chrome, containing direct hotlinks to the Chrome download page. Google has recently penalized a number of other companies for such behaviour, including J C Penney, Forbes and Overstock. See also my 2006 post on BMW Search Requests.

A number of offending posts were discovered because they contained the magic words This post was sponsored by Google, and the Google search engine dutifully delivered a list of webpages containing these words. (This kind of transparency was foreseen by Isaac Asimov in a story called "All the troubles of the world", in which the computer Multivac was unable to conceal its own self-destructive behaviour.)

As a number of search engine analysts have pointed out, there are two problems with the sponsored pages. Besides containing the offending links, they are also pretty thin in terms of content. (Google has recently developed a search filter code-named Panda, which is intended to demote such low-value content, but this filter is extremely costly in computing power and is apparently only run sporadically.) Many of these pages credit Google Chrome for having helped a company in Vermont over the past five years, despite the fact that Google Chrome hasn't been available for that long. None of them explain why Google Chrome might be better than other browsers.

So here we have an interesting interaction between the elements of VPEC-T. 


Value - How is commercial sponsorship reconciled with high-value content? Does this incident expose a conflict of interest inside Google?

Policy - How does Google apply its strict rules to itself?

Events - How was this situation detected (with the aid of Google itself)? Will any future incidents be as easy to detect?

Content - What is the net effect on the content, on which Google's market position depends?

Trust - What kinds of trust have been eroded in this situation? How can trust be restored, and how long will it take?



Sources


Aaron Wall, Google caught buying paid links yet again (SEO Book 2 Jan 2012)

Danny Sullivan, Google’s Jaw-Dropping Sponsored Post Campaign For Chrome (SearchEngineLand 2 Jan 2012)

Charles Arthur, Will Google be forced to ban its own browser from its index? (Guardian 3 Jan 2012) Google shoves Chrome down search rankings after sponsored blog mixup (Guardian 4 Jan 2012)

 

Related post: Towards a VPEC-T analysis of Google (October 2011)

Friday, October 14, 2011

Google as a Platform (not)

Google vs Amazon (again). @davidsprott reckons Steve Yegge's rant is spot on. Steve Yegge is a software engineer who used to work for Amazon and now works for Google, despite the supposedly accidental publication of a long and opinionated rant (his words) complaining that

'[what] Google doesn't do well is Platforms. We don't understand platforms. We don't "get" platforms.'

(For more context, see Steve Yegge's second thoughts on Google+).

Waddya mean, Google doesn't get platforms? Surely Google is a major player in platform, especially in the so-called Cloud? Dion Hinchcliffe sounded fairly convinced when he was Comparing Amazon's and Google's Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) Offerings back in April 2008.

"Amazon and Google have strategically built up an extensive set of services over the last few years and have made some very interesting assumptions that will determine who their customers are (consumers, startups, enterprises) and what type of business models can sit on top of them (advertising, subscriptions, cheapest source of outsourced computing resources). ... Google and Amazon have emerged to be the leaders in this space while Microsoft, IBM, and especially Oracle and SAP are either well behind or have unclear plans to enter the PaaS space. Both of these companies formed their DNA around the world of the Web and deeply understand how to leverage the enormous strengths of the Web platform."

So what went wrong? This guy (Yegge) sure knows one thing, says @pardhas, building platforms is not just collecting your products on one plate. For Yegge, platforms is about eating your own dogfood. Not just Amazon, but also Facebook - hey, even Microsoft understands platforms better than Google.

But there is something missing from Steve Yegge's account. He sees the (lack of) platform from an engineering perspective, but what he doesn't talk about is the enterprise/ecosystem perspective.

@davidsprott's tweet ends with the formula "SOA + platforms = competitive advantage".  David and I have written a great deal about ecosystem SOA and ecosystem architecture, and we have long credited Jeff Bezos of Amazon as someone who "gets" ecosystem.

Among other things, "getting ecosystem" means understanding the variety of ways in which the social complexity of collaborations create value for the customer, and therefore how, from the perspective of the supplier, platform architectures can capture indirect value. See Philip Boxer's presentation on supporting social complexity in collaborative enterprises, as well as my presentation on Next Generation Enterprise Architecture, both from the recent Unicom EA Forum in London.

As I pointed out in my recent VPEC-T analysis of Google, Google is adopting a positional strategy - capturing some territory and defending it against its competitors. Amazon and Apple have shifted towards open source competition on their platforms (relational strategy) while Google is still closed-source.

In his post on Tomorrow's Networked Economy, @JDeragon praises Google+ for becoming an integrated portal. Er, wasn't that AOL's strategy? And Yahoo's for that matter? Maybe Google has greater ability to execute this strategy than they did, but it still looks more like yesterday's networked economy. Have you read Kevin Kelly's book?



For Apple's shift from product to platform, see my post on Disney, Pixar, Apple and Jobs from February 2006.

For the shift from positional stategy to relational strategy, see Philip Boxer and Bernie Cohen, Triply Articulated Modelling of the Anticipatory Enterprise and Philip Boxer, Architectures that integrate  differentiated behaviours.

For more on Ecosystem SOA and Ecosystem Architecture, please browse the Ecosystem category on this blog. Here are some further links.

Jeff Bezos Letter to Shareholders (via Geekwire) (April 2011)
Bob Ellinger, Enterprise SOA vs Ecosystem SOA (April 2011)
Vaughan Merlyn, From Enterprise Architecture to Ecosystem Architecture (July 2008)
David Sprott, Introducing Smart Ecosystem Architecture (October 2009)

Monday, October 10, 2011

Towards a VPEC-T analysis of Google

#entarch Enterprise architects need to understand values and policies. VPEC-T is an approach that is particularly useful for situations where there are multiple conflicting values and policies, or multiple interpretations of What-Is-Going-On.

In this post, I want to look at Google. Can we infer its values and policies from its observed behaviour (over time).


We may start by asking what events we think Google is paying attention to. Here are some of the events that are available to Google.

1. You search for "XYZ"
2. You skip over the first few items, and click on the third item on the second page.
3. You look at a webpage and then come back to continue your search.
4  You rephrase and clarify your enquiry.

Google is pretty coy on its exact use of these events, but most Google-watchers assume that these events have an influence on its search algorithms and/or its advertising algorithms. In other words, we may presume that Google is generating valuable content from these events.

Google has indulged in a wide range of initiatives over the years, many of which have no obvious line to revenue. But all of them have the potential to generate vast amounts of rich content - much of it related to the observed behaviour of internet users. On this interpretation of Google's strategy, initiatives are dropped, not because they fail to generate revenue but because they fail to generate enough of the desired kind of content. Google is betting its future on building and maintaining this content through powerful positive feedback.

Google's strategy is therefore surprisingly traditional - it involves capturing some territory and defending it against its competitors. Here's an example - Google provides the Android platform to mobile device manufacturers. When Motorola wanted to use Skyhook's voice recognition instead of Google's, Google forced it to fall into line. Daniel Soar argues that this was not because Google executives feared losing revenue but because they feared losing access to an important source of content. As Soar puts it, "Google faced the unfamiliar problem of the negative feedback loop: the fewer people that used its product, the less information it would have and the worse the product would get." (Google has since bought out Motorola Mobility, which presumably resolves some of the trust issues as well.)

Daniel Soar, You can't get away from Google, London Review of Books, Vol 33 No 19, 6 October 2011


Can we understand Google's phenomenal collection and use of data as an example of organizational intelligence? Google is certainly seeking to differentiate each Internet user's experience, as well as integrate across multiple domains (web browsing, email, blogging, voice, video, satnav, and so on). Google already has an army of brilliant engineers as well as an alarmingly large carbon footprint. There is lots of evidence of Google's integrating these resources into one of the most innovative sociotechnical systems on the planet.

(By the way, when I asked Google itself about its carbon footprint, it recommended I look at a recent story in the Guardian (8 September 2011). I can see that Google has been asked this question many times before, because it pops up so quickly as an expected search term. But why should I trust Google's recommendation, and how can I ever discover what newspapers would be recommended to a browser with a different browsing history to mine?)

But a lot of this learning looks suspiciously like first-order learning. So the content gets better, based on better capture of events, but to what extent is there any systematic evolution of policies or questioning of values? There may well be some second-order or third-order learning, but it's not easy to see from the outside. There is also an important question about the relationship between Google's own ability to learn from its accumulated content, and Google's ability or willingness to provide a rich platform for learning by others in its ecosystem - in other words, a broader notion of collective intelligence.

I wonder if there are any lessons for other organizations? Sometimes firms like Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google (Eric Schmidt's Gang of Four) seem pretty far removed from most other organizations, but their platform strategies and operating patterns will surely become increasingly relevant in other sectors. A traditional retailer may now collect and analyse a much larger quantity of data about its customers' behaviour than ever before, even if this is still several orders of magnitude less than what Google does. A traditional telecoms or media company may now see itself as a platform business in a multisided market. Therefore instead of seeing Eric Schmidt's Gang of Four as impossibly remote and mysterious organizations, populated by unbelievably talented and creative engineers, we should start to think of them as harbingers of the enterprise of the future.



See also my post Google as a Platform (not)



 book now  Business Architecture Bootcamp (November 22-23, 2011)
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Thursday, August 20, 2009

Enterprise Suffix - Companies as Categories

@tetradian Tom Graves is annoyed at Enterprise 2.0. He (rightly) complains that the term as defined by Andrew McAfee refers to software, and tries to construct an alternative definition that is more business-oriented.

While I agree with his complaint, I am not convinced that a business-oriented definition of "Enterprise 2.0" is a worthwhile exercise. The "2.0" suffix is inextricably linked to the software paradigm; it is a metaphor for strict version control, and really only makes sense to software engineers and dictators. To produce the Third Reich (or as we should now call it "Reich 3.0") required a massive amount of centralized control and alignment (known as Gleichschaltung).

Software engineers who want to sound cool often use names instead of numbers. Apple operating systems are named after large cats, so we might have something like Enterprise Snow Leopard. (Thanks to Ron Tolido.) Microsoft plays this game as well - see my post on Google and Longhorn.

Software people may describe enterprises in terms of version numbers, but how do business people describe enterprises? Usually by comparing with something else. Listen to how entrepreneurs bid for venture capital. "It's going to be like eBay with a dash of vodka." "It's going to combine the innovation of Google with the popularity of er Google." In other words, they tell stories and paint pictures.

At any given time, there are a few companies that everyone wants to emulate - not just in terms of market share and profit, but also in terms of the internal management and organization - typically based on descriptions in the popular business literature. One of the early classics of this genre was Peters and Waterman, In Search of Excellence, which held up several American firms for admiration and emulation. (These recommendations look really dated now; and as Jason Cohen points out, Business Advice is Plagued by Survivor Bias.) In the heyday of quality management, many people tried to emulate Xerox and Motorola. More recently, Joshua Cooper Ramo, in a book called The Age of the Unthinkable, identifies Google and Hizb'allah as two of the most innovative organizations of our time.

Therefore if we must have an enterprise suffix, and if we want this to be meaningful to business people, let's use well-known companies as the categories. So if you want to emulate Google, then you need to implement Enterprise-a-Google.

Not perfect I agree, but anything's better than these dammed version numbers.

Thursday, February 09, 2006

BMW Search Requests

Another controversy hits Google. German car-maker BMW offends against Google's webspam policies and gets delisted. After three days of "death penalty", the listing is resurrected. (Smaller companies might be lucky to be reinstated months after a lesser offence.)

Sources: Matt Cutts (Google), Search Engine Watch

Google is here playing the same defacto regulatory role as a stock exchange - if you want us to list you, please play according to our rules. (Google can therefore add extra rules to those rules imposed by national or international law. Whether Google can subtract rules is of course an entirely different and perhaps even more controversial question.)

But there is a crucial difference. With a stock market, there is a documented agreement between the stock exchange and the listed company, and any disputes can be taken to legal process. However, it is difficult to see how any company, however large, might establish in law that it had been unfairly treated by Google in such a matter. Even if there was clear evidence of financial loss as a result of a material change in search ranking, it would probably be impossible to pin liability for this loss onto Google.

Look at BMW's position from a service-oriented perspective. BMW's promotional and marketing capability is critically dependent on Internet search services provided to BMW's customers by Google and its competitors. This is of course true of many companies, large and small. But for most or all of these companies (and I presume this is the case for BMW), there is no formal contract with Google that governs this particular dependency, and no defined service level agreement.

Google's published statements appear to offer some comfort, implying that it will only take this kind of action against a company in response to some detected non-compliance on the company's part with Google's rules. (We can interpret these statements as part of a contractual pseudo-contractual specification of the service provided by Google.) But there are two ways in which this official specification can fail. Firstly, Google might make a mistake - may incorrectly punish a company for something it hasn't done. And secondly, Google might be tricked by a third party (competitor or vandal) into punitive action. (For example, by a clever combination of cybersquatting and hacking.)

Bottom Line: If you are dependent on a service you don't control, then there is a risk that needs to be managed. In a service economy, there will be many services that you want to use, because the potential rewards of these services are well high enough to justify the risks. But these risks still exist, and service management needs to include proper attention to the relevant risk factors.

 

Update

A related example (March 2006), via Seth Godin. Kinderstart sues Google over lower page ranking (Reuters).

See also:  Creeping Business Dependency (March 2011), Unruly Google and VPEC-T (January 2012)

Friday, January 20, 2006

DoJ Search Requests

cross-posted from Asymmetric Design blog 

Various people talking about the dispute between Google and the US Department of Justice (DoJ), including Boing Boing, Search Engine Watch, Emergent Chaos, and my old colleague Graham Shevlin.

One line of discussion relates to privacy. Some commentators are praising Google for resisting the US Government’s demands for data, when its competitors have apparently complied.

But there is another important consideration, which appears relevant to Google’s position. There is an huge gap (asymmetry) between the information requirement (as stated by the DoJ) and the data on Google’s database. (See especially Danny Sullivan’s post at SearchEngineWatch.)

So the DoJ is hoping to solve a complex problem with very large amounts of data? Does it really make sense for the DoJ to copy the raw data from Google onto its own processors? In a service-oriented grid-enabled world, it would seem to make more sense (and raise fewer privacy concerns as well) for the DoJ to collaborate with Google (and its competitors) - to compose intelligent and relevant analytical enquiries that can be run by Google (as a service, albeit commandeered by the Government) to help solve the DoJ’s problem.

Of course Google is an interested party in the outcome of the DoJ’s deliberations, but does engaging it as a trusted partner in the analysis really increase its ability to bias the outcome in a self-interested way? And if it provides knowledge and metadata services rather than raw data, this might mitigate the threat to its position as a trusted custodian of personal search records?